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#2A-5/2V85 
STATE OF NEW YOTtK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7798 
CITY OP SCHENECTADY. 
Charging Party. 
GRASSO & GRASSO. ESQS. (JANE K. FININ. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BUCHYN, O'HARE AND WERNER, ESQS. (DOMINIQUE A. 
POLLARA, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
of Schenectady (City) to the decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the Schenectady 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) improperly submitted a 
demand for a shift differential to compulsory interest 
arbitration. The demand was that police officers assigned 
to certain shifts should receive premium pay. It was made 
pursuant to a contract reopener applicable to the third 
year of a three-year contract period which, by its terms, 
covered "salary scale only".— The City asserts that 
i/pBA made a similar demand while bargaining for the 
original three-year contract, but withdrew it as a part of 
those negotiations. 
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a shift differential is not within the contemplation of the 
lanaguage "salary scale". 
The words "salary scale" are found in two places in 
the contract: Article XVIII. §9, which authorizes the 
reopening of negotiations, and Article XI, §1, which 
provides: 
The wages or salary scale for members 
of the Department, including in-grade 
annual increments, if any, and 
longevity allowance shall be as set 
forth in Appendix A and B attached 
hereto and made a part hereof. 
The appendices referred to in Article XI, §1, are for the 
first and second years of the contract period 
respectively. They consist of base salaries, step 
increments, longevity payments, and a differential for 
investigators. It is the contention of the City that by 
restricting negotiations to the "salary scale". Article 
XVIII, §9. permits only changes in the dollar amounts found 
in appendices A and B. The ALJ found, however, that 
negotiations for an improved "salary scale" could include 
differential pay, which would be a new form of compensation. 
Although not specifically mentioned in them, the 
exceptions argue that the parole evidence rule bars 
consideration of testimony as to what the parties intended 
by their agreement because the written contract constitutes 
the entire agreement. 
That rule provides that extrinsic evidence may not be 
relied upon to contradict or vary the terms of a written 
Board - U-7798 -3 
agreement where the entire agreement was embodied in the 
writing. Where it is clear, however, that the writing does 
not completely integrate the terms of the agreement, parole 
evidence, not inconsistent with the writing, may be used to 
2/ 
show what the entire contract really is.— 
The parole evidence rule applies to the interpretation 
of collective bargaining agreements as well as to 
commercial contracts. However, courts have found that, by 
their nature, collective bargaining agreements are more 
susceptible than commercial contracts to ambiguities which 
justify reliance upon parole evidence. Cappa v. Wiseman. 
469 F. Supp. 437, 100 LLRM 3083 (N.D.. Cal. 1979). Under 
such circumstances, "evidence of prior negotiations is 
admissible to show that the writing was not intended as a 
final expression of the terms and conditions."—' 
Applying this test to the record evidence, we find 
that neither the written contract nor the reopener clause 
integrates the entire agreement of the parties. The City, 
itself, introduced evidence showing that there had been an 
oral agreement to permit the reopening of negotiations 
regarding work during vacation periods. Furthermore, the 
^New York Jurisprudence, Evidence. Volume 22. 
Section 627. 
^-/Restatement (Second) of Contracts §209(3). 
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differential for investigators specified in the appendices 
is indicative of an ambiquity as to whether other 
differentials might have been within the contemplation of 
the parties when they referred to "salary scale". 
Accordingly, it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider the 
testimony regarding the meaning of this language. 
The record establishes that the City's prior collective 
bargaining agreements with both PBA and the union 
representing its firefighters contained a reopener for a 
negotiation of wages. The City was disturbed when, under 
that agreement, the firefighters' union had attempted to 
negotiate such matters as educational incentive bonuses, 
productivity bonuses, additional holiday pay, clothing 
allowances and pension benefits. Accordingly, when the new 
agreement was being negotiated, its labor counsel proposed 
the substitution of the language "salary scale" in the 
reopener clause for the words "wages or wage scale", which 
he remembered to be in the reopener clause of the expired 
agreements. 
Although the language in the prior agreements had 
precipitated a grievance, he testified that to his surprise, 
his suggested substitute language was accepted without any 
discussion as to its meaning. PBA's chief negotiator, who 
had also been the representative of the firefighters, 
remembered things differently. He testified that the 
Board - U-7798 
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proposed language was discussed, and that he was given an 
oral assurance that while it was intended to preclude the 
negotiation of those above-mentioned matters that the 
firefighters had attempted to raise pursuant to the prior 
reopener. it was not intended to preclude the negotiation of 
a wage differential based upon different shift asignments. 
The ALJ found the testimony of PBA's witnesses more 
credible that that of the City's witnesses. We find no 
reason to disturb his resolution of the credibility issue 
. . 4/ and affirm his decision.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 24, 198 5 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^Compare, The Fashion Institute of Technology v. 
Helsby, 44 AD2d 550, 7 PERB ir7005 (1st Dept. . 1974). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7697 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
UNIT. DUTCHESS COUNTY EDUCATION LOCAL 
867, CSEA. AFSCME. AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
RAYMOND G. KRUSE. P.C.. for Respondent 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (WILLIAM M. 
WALLENS. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Wappingers Central School District (District) to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding it in violation 
of §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Taylor Law. The ALJ found it. 
in violation of §209-a.l(e) in that it refused to pay 
incremental salary increases and longevity payments to 
employees represented by Wappingers Central School District 
Unit, Dutchess County Education Local 867, CSEA, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA) after the expiration of its collective 
bargaining agreement with CSEA and before the conclusion of a 
successor agreement. He found it in violation of §209-a.l(d) 
in that it refused, after the expiration of the parties' 
» 98 
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agreement, to provide paid personal leave for religious 
holidays in accordance with a past practice.— 
With respect to the ALJ's finding that the District 
violated §209-a.l(e) by not making incremental wage and 
longevity payments in accordance with the terms of the 
expired agreement, the District argues that the record is 
inadequate to prove that such payment increases were due 
after the expiration of the agreement. In doing so, it is 
not asserting that the agreement contained a "sunset" clause 
pursuant to which any obligation it may have had to provide 
such increases was terminated. Rather, it contends that CSEA 
has not satisfied its burden of proving that the terms of the 
contract, as extended by the operation of §209-a.l(e), had 
required any such payment to actual employees between the 
date of the expiration of the agreement and the time of the 
filing of the charge. 
The parties' expired agreement provides for incremental 
salary and longevity step increases on the anniversary dates 
of unit employees. For the purpose of computing such step 
•i/cSEA also complained that the District had refused 
to pay unit employees hired after September 1, 1984, the 
wages and benefits specified in the expired agreement. 
Noting that CSEA had filed a grievance embodying this 
complaint and that the parties' grievance procedure 
culminates in binding arbitration, the ALJ ruled that this 
specification of the charge should be conditionally 
dismissed in accordance with the deferral policy of this 
Board. There were no exceptions to this ruling of the ALJ 
Board - U-7697 -3 
increases, it provides that "the anniversary date for all 
employees hired between July 1 and December 31 shall be July 
1. and the anniversary date for all employees hired between 
January 1 and June 30 shall be January 1." Accordingly, by 
reason of the extension of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement pursuant to §209-a.l(e.) of the Taylor Law, any unit 
employees who were hired between July 1 and December 31 of 
any year would:, have been entitled to step increases 
applicable to them under the salary schedule as of July 1, 
1984. 
In its answer to the charge, the District denied the 
allegation of the charge that it "failed to pay eligible 
employees increments and longevity payments due them under 
the agreement . . .". but admitted that it had "not made any 
incremental changes which would have been due after July 1. 
1984, nor any longevity increases which would have been due 
after that date . . . ." As noted by the District in its 
brief in support of its exceptions, the ALJ interpreted the 
answer "to mean that the District had admitted any and all 
facts which the Administrative Law Judge might deem necessary 
to the proof of the charging party's case . . . ." 
The District correctly argues now, as it did in its post 
hearing brief to the ALJ, that it never admitted that any 
unit employees were actually due step increases as of July 1, 
1984. Thus, according to the District, the charge fails for 
the absence of proof that any unit employees had been hired 
*• 9700 
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between July 1 and December 31 of any year and were thereby 
entitled to step increases. 
We find merit in this argument. The ALJ's finding of a 
violation is not supported by record evidence regarding all 
the essential elements of the violation, and it must be set 
aside. We note, however, that, by reason of his 
misinterpretation of the District's admission, the ALJ 
restricted the hearing to evidence relating to the 
specification of the charge alleging a changed practice 
regarding paid personal leave for religious holidays issue. 
This was a reversible error, misleading CSEA as to what it 
had to prove to establish a violation regarding the step 
income issue, and depriving it of an opportunity to do so. 
Accordingly, in the interest of justice and in furtherance of 
the policies of the Taylor Law. we remand this matter to the 
ALJ to take further evidence regarding the entitlement of 
unit employees to salary increments and longevity pay between 
the date of the expiration of the agreement and the time of 
the filing of the charge. 
The District argues that the ALJ erred in finding that 
it failed to provide paid personal leave for religious 
holidays in accordance with its past practice in that he 
relied upon hearsay evidence to reach that finding. CSEA's 
sole witness on this point was its president, Mary Jane 
MacNair. MacNair testified that there had been a past 
practice of granting such leave, which was recorded by the 
w 
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District on the personnel records of the absent employee 
either by the notation "R" for religious or "P" for 
personal. She further testified that this practice was 
terminated on September 5, 1984, pursuant.to a memorandum 
sent by the District's Superintendent to all its employees. 
That memorandum is in the record. It states: "No paid 
time off for religious observance shall be given in the 
District outside time off specifically granted under the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement." The expired collective 
bargaining agreement specified reasons why paid personal 
leave might be taken. The observance of religious holidays 
was not one of them. 
MacNair had never taken religious leave. Her knowledge 
that other unit employees had been given religious leave with 
pay is based upon reports to her by such other employees. 
While she saw the notations "R" and "P" on the payroll 
records of employees, her knowledge that these letters stood 
for religious leave and personal leave respectively came from 
the unit employees involved. 
The District argues that MacNair's testimony is hearsay 
evidence and therefore insufficient to prove a) the existence 
of a past practice of granting paid holiday leave; b) that if 
such a past practice had existed, it was changed; c) that if 
such a past practice had been changed, it affected unit 
«J ill, 
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employees to their detriment. Acknowledging in its answer 
that it had "altered its policy on religious holidays . . .", 
the District argues that CSEA has not satisfied its burden of 
proving "what the policy is that has been changed . . . ." 
We reject this argument of the District.. The rule in 
New York State is that hearsay evidence is admissible at 
administrative hearings but that a determination must be 
supported by some substantial evidence which is acceptable in 
2/ 
a court of law.— This means that an administrative agency 
can consider hearsay evidence which is inadmissible in a 
court of law but which is of the character that would make it 
otherwise reliable to supplement or resolve ambiguities in 
legally competent evidence. 
The legally competent evidence establishes that, on 
September 5, 1984, the District altered a policy with respect 
to religious holidays; it also establishes that after that 
date, there would be no paid leave for religious 
observances. Next, the legally competent evidence 
establishes that notice of the change was sent to all the 
i/Ray v. Blum. 91 App. Div. 2d 822 (4th Dept.. 1982); 
Warner v. New York State Racing and Wagering Board, 
99 A.D. 2d 680 (4th Dept. 1984). 
QW2-
Board - U-7697 -7 
District's employees, including unit members. Finally, it 
includes MacNair's testimony that by her own observation, she 
knew that unit employees who had been absent for religious 
observance prior to September 5. 1984 had the notation of "P" 
or "R" marked on their payroll records. 
MacNair further testified that she was told by the 
affected employees that they had been paid for personal or 
religious leave on those days. Such information would have 
been given to her in the normal course of events by virtue of 
her role as president of the union representing the 
employees. Given its circumstantial setting, this testimony, 
albeit hearsay, was reliable. 
We find that there is substantial evidence which is 
acceptable in a court of law to support the findings of the 
ALJ. We further find that the hearsay evidence which the ALJ 
considered to supplement and characterize the legally 
competent evidence was. under the circumstances, sufficiently 
reliable for that purpose. We therefore affirm his decision 
that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by 
unilaterally changing its past practice of paying unit 
employees for absences on religious holidays. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER: 
1. The District to: 
-8 
a. revoke the memorandum from 
Superintendent Gilmore, dated 
September 5. 1984, by which the 
District altered its policy of 
approving unit members' requests for 
paid leave for religious holidays, 
to the extent the memorandum applies 
to unit members. 
b. restore its practice of approving 
unit members' requests for paid 
leave for religious holidays, and 
make whole any unit employees who 
were denied such leave by reason of 
the District's altered policy. 
c. post a notice in the form attached 
at all locations normally used to 
communicate with unit employees. 
That the determination of the ALJ that 
the District violated §209-a.l(e) of the 
Taylor Law by failing to pay unit 
employees incremental wage and longevity 
increases due to them be set aside, and 
that this matter be, and it hereby is. 
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remanded to the ALJ for further 
proceedings as required by this decision. 
DATED: May 24, 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R.l^ ewnian, Chairman 
David C. Ran 
-« y j *> 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
PUBLIC 
NEW YORK STATE 
MPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by Wappingers 
Central School District Unit, Dutchess County Education Local 867, 
CSEA, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Union) that the Wappingers Central School 
District (District): 
1„ Will Hevoke the memorandum from Superintendent Gilmore, 
dated September 5, 1984, by which the District altered its policy 
of approving unit members' requests for paid leave for religious 
holidays, to the extent the memorandum applies to unit members«, 
20 Will restore its practice of approving unit members' 
requests for paid leave for religious holidays, and make whole any 
unit employees who were denied such leave by reason of the District's 
altered policy,, 
Wappingers Central School District 
Dated. May 24, 1985 By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
. « j 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONONDAGA-MADISON BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7742 
ONONDAGA-MADISON BOCES FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS. NYSUT/AFT. LOCAL NO. 28 97. 
Charging Party. 
GARRY A. LUKE, for Respondent 
HELEN W. BEALE. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the Onondaga-Madison BOCES 
Federation of Teachers, NYSUT/AFT, Local No. 2897 (Local 
2897). It alleges that the Onondaga-Madison Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Taylor Law by submitting two nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation to a fact finder. The first demand, identified by 
the parties as BOCES I, provides: 
BOCES I: Should negotiations not be completed 
prior to June 30. 1984. the BOCES requests that 
the Association refrain from insisting upon 
continuation of any nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiations that are contained in the current 
agreement. 
The ALJ determined that this demand constitutes a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation because, on its face, the 
subject matter pertains to nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation. She further found it nonmandatory because it 
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would require Local 2897 to waive its statutory right to 
benefit from the terms of an expired agreement until a new 
agreement is negotiated, and a demand that a party waive a 
substantive statutory benefit is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation.— 
In its exceptions, BOCES characterizes BOCES I as not 
being a demand at all. Rather, according to BOCES, it is a 
notice to Local 2897 that it was unwilling to renegotiate such 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation as were dealt with in the 
parties' expired agreement, and that it was not required to do 
so. 
Such a notice would not be improper. However, in BOCES' 
brief to the ALJ. it stated. "The BOCES contends that the 
proposals styled BOCES I and II are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining . . . ." On the basis of this statement, we 
conclude that BOCES I was a demand and not merely a notice. 
We further conclude that, as a demand, it is a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation for the reasons given by the ALJ. 
The second demand, identified by the parties as BOCES II, 
provides: 
BOCES II: The parties agree that all terms and 
conditions of employment not covered by this 
Agreement shall continue to be subject to the 
Board's decision and control and shall not be 
the subject of negotiations until the 
1/city of Binqhamton, 9 PERB 1f3026. aff'd. sub nom 
City of Binghamton v. Helsby. 9 PERB ^7019 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
Co.. 1976). 
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commencement of the negotiations for a 
successor to this agreement. 
The ALJ determined that the demand is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
Local 2897 correctly asserts that the Taylor Law gives it 
the right to bargain about mandatory subjects of negotiation and 
that such matters not covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, and not explicitly waived, may be negotiated during 
2/ the life of that agreement.— It further contends that BOCES 
II would restrict its statutory right to bargain about such 
matters during the life of the agreement, and it therefore 
constitutes a demand for a waiver of a statutory right. 
We find that contention flawed. The Taylor Law obligation 
that public employers and employee organizations negotiate the 
terms and conditions of employment of unit employees affords the 
parties a process, and not a substantive benefit. That process 
may be satisfied by negotiations for an agreement that would 
grant a public employer the authority to act unilaterally with 
respect to terms and conditions of employment no less than by one 
in which the parties specify substantive settlement terms. Such 
3 / 
a grant of authority is a mandatory subject of negotiation.— 
Local 2897's objections to BOCES II therefore are more properly 
directed to the merits of the demand than to its negotiability. 
^See New Paltz CSD. 11 PERB ir3057 (1978). 
3/city of Albany. 7 PERB 1f3078 (1974). 
9710 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ. and 
WE ORDER BOCES to negotiate in good 
faith by withdrawing BOCES I from the 
fact finder. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that in all other 
respects the charge herein be. and it 
hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 24. 1985 
Albany, New York 
#2D-5/2V85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF SCHENECTADY and SHERIFF. 
Respondents. 
-and- CASE NOS. 
U-7473 & U-7532 
SCHENECTADY COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS B. HAYNER, COUNTY ATTORNEY (JOHN J. 
WARNER, JR.. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondents 
GRASSO & GRASSO. ESQS. (JANE K. FININ. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The two charges herein were filed by the Schenectady 
County Sheriff's Benevolent Association (SBA). an employee 
organization which is certified to represent the employees of 
the County of Schenectady and the Schenectady County Sheriff, 
a joint employer. 
The first charge has two specifications. One is that 
the joint employer violated §209-a.l(a). (c) and (d) of the 
Taylor Law in that while the parties were in negotiations for 
a collective bargaining agreement to succeed one that had 
expired, it unilaterally, and for improper reasons, deprived 
all but five of the unit employees of their deputy-sheriff 
Board - U-7473 & 
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status. The other is that the joint employer violated those 
provisions of the Taylor Law in that it unilaterally changed 
a past practice by curtailing parking privileges that had 
been enjoyed by unit employees. The second charge is that 
the joint employer violated §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) in that 
it unilaterally, and for improper reasons, assigned female 
correction officers to male detention facilities. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the second 
charge and the specification of the first dealing with the 
status of unit employees as deputy sheriffs. He found merit 
in the specification of the first charge dealing with the 
parking privileges, but only to the extent that it alleged a 
violation of §209-a.l(d). 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of SBA to 
the ALJ's dismissal of its second charge and the deputy 
sheriff status specification of its first charge.—' It 
also comes to us on the joint employer's exceptions to the 
determination of the ALJ that it violated §209-a.l(d) by 
curtailing the parking privileges of unit employees. 
I/SBA does not except to the ALJ's determination that 
the joint employer's conduct with respect to the parking 
specification merely violates §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. 
-jc *J (JL 
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THE STATUS OF UNIT EMPLOYEES AS DEPUTY SHERIFFS 
Our certification of SBA as the representative of unit 
employees was issued on the merits, after a contested 
proceeding. In issuing our decision we concluded that unit 
..._.. -2/ . . 
employees were deputy sheriffs.— The joint employer now 
asserts that only five of the current unit employees are 
deputy sheriffs. Whatever the factual basis of this 
assertion, as a matter of law the joint employer is 
collaterally estopped from denying that any of the unit 
employees were other than deputy sheriffs on February 20. 
1981. the date of the certification. As noted by the ALJ, it 
is possible that all but five of the present unit employees 
are not deputy sheriffs. This would be the case if 
subsequently hired unit employees were not deputized, and the 
deputy sheriff status of the other original unit employees 
had been revoked. 
The ALJ made no determination as to whether either of 
these had occurred, and SBA argues that this was error. It 
asserts that the change in the status of unit employees from 
deputy to nondeputy deprives them of significant benefits, 
and is therefore a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
SBA also argues that the joint employer's announcement 
of the change on March 16, 1984, which was during the course 
of negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement to 
•^'County of Schenectady and Sheriff. 14 PERB ir3013 (1981). 
- 9714 
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succeed one that had expired on December 31, 1983, evidenced 
a design to influence the course of the negotiations 
improperly. The ALJ found that the record does not support 
any inference of improper motivation, and we find nothing in 
SBA's exceptions or in our reading of the record to convince 
us of the contrary. 
In arguing that deputy sheriff status carries with it 
benefits, the loss of which changes the terms and conditions 
of employment of unit employees, SBA contends that deputy 
sheriffs enjoy benefits under General Municipal Law §50-J and 
§207-C- that are not enjoyed by other employees. It also 
contends that as deputy sheriff's, unit employees are 
entitled to representation and lobbying efforts by SBA's 
affiliates, but that such efforts would not be afforded to a 
unit of employees other than deputy sheriffs. Finally, it 
contends that the loss of deputy sheriff status would destroy 
its negotiating unit. 
We find no merit in any of these contentions. The 
statutory provisions afforded to deputy sheriffs by the 
General Municipal Law are, by virtue of being statutory 
3/ 
benefits, not mandatory subjects of negotiation.— 
1/Binqhamton, 9 PERB 1P026 (1976). aff'd. 9 PERB T7019 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1976). 
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Waverly CSD. 10 PERB ir3103 (1977), cited by SBA for the 
proposition that an employer may not deprive unit employees 
of statutory benefits, is inapplicable. First, the statutory 
rights contemplated by Waverly CSD are the Taylor Law rights 
of representation and organization. Second, as noted by the 
ALJ. 
Even if the statutory concomitants of deputy 
status were extinguished, malevolent intent is 
requisite to a violation of the Act. In the 
absence of proof of unlawful motive, direct or 
circumstantial, [even] decimation of a unit to 
whatever extent, by the abolition of titles is 
not an improper practice, (footnote omitted). 
In any event, there is no indication that a change in 
status of the unit employees would destroy the negotiating 
unit. The basis of the separate unit established in 1981 was 
not that the unit employees were deputy sheriffs while the 
other employees in their prior unit were not. Rather, it was 
that these employees worked for the joint employer while the 
other employees did not. This is unchanged. 
We also find no merit in the contention that the joint 
employer has injured the unit employees by depriving them of 
the lobbying efforts which SBA's affiliates provide to deputy 
sheriffs. The services that SBA and its affiliates choose to 
provide to unit employees is an internal union matter over 
which the joint employer has no control. 
For the reasons stated herein we affirm the decision of 
716 
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the ALJ dismissing this specification of the first charge.— 
REASSIGNMENT OF FEMALE CORRECTION OFFICERS 
The ALJ determined that the joint employer acted for 
legitimate business reasons when it assigned female 
correction officers to male detention facilities. There had 
not been a sufficient number of female correction officers 
available to supervise female prisoners and the joint 
employer therefore transferrred its female prisoners to 
another facility. The female correction officers were then 
assigned to male detention facilities where they were 
required to perform duties that were appropriate to their 
jobs. SBA argues that the new assignments were more 
dangerous than those that had been previously assigned to the 
female correction officers. While that may be so, it. 
nevertheless, was a management prerogative for the joint 
5/ employer to make those assignments.— 
i/we also reject SBA's exceptions arguing that the ALJ 
refused to reopen the record to take additional evidence and 
rejected some evidence during the hearing. The proferred 
evidence dealt with the question whether unit employees were 
deputy sheriffs. As noted, this is irrelevant to the basis of 
the ALJ's decision, and our own. 
-^/whether an increase in hazard would justify impact 
demands need not be decided since there is no allegation that 
any such demand was made or that the joint employer refused to 
negotiate impact. 
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THE CURTAILING OF PARKING PRIVILEGES 
There is a parking lot adjacent to the County Jail which 
had accommodated over 100 automobiles. It was used by all 
county employees, employees of the joint employer, employees 
of the State Office of Court Administration and even by 
members of the general public. Parking spaces had not been 
specifically assigned to unit employees but, in practice, the 
spaces nearest to the jail were usually left for them on a 
first come basis. 
This changed when, by reason of a construction project, 
the jail facility was expanded into the parking lot, causing 
the elimination of the 20 spaces nearest to the jail. By 
reason of the loss of the 20 spaces, there was no longer 
sufficient parking in the lot for all the employees. The 
County addressed this problem in discussions with other 
unions representing its employees and those of the Office of 
Court Administration, and a solution was arranged. SBA was 
not made a part of these discussions. The parking lot was 
restricted to employees of the County, the Office of Court 
Administration and the joint employer on the basis of 
seniority. The 20 least senior employees, regardless of 
negotiating unit, were denied a right to park in the lot and 
were given parking privileges in another lot. 400 yards away. 
Obviously, parking in a- lot almost a guarter of a mile 
away from the jail is less convenient for unit employees than 
parking in a lot adjacent to it. It was wrong for the joint 
Board -
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employer to impose this solution upon employees in the SBA 
unit while the unions representing County and OCA employees 
had been included in discussions designed to resolve the 
problem. By doing so the joint employer violated §209-a.l(d) 
in that it changed a past practice unilaterally. 
In its exceptions the joint employer contends that SBA 
waived its right to object to the change because it never 
demanded negotiations on the assignment of parking spaces. 
This argument is rejected. The violation herein is not a 
refusal to negotiate over demands that were made but a 
failure to negotiate by virtue of having taken unilateral 
6 / 
action.— 
The ALJ ordered the joint employer to restore the 
parking privileges to unit employees that they had enjoyed 
before the elimination of 20 spaces. We find this remedial 
order appropriate. Obviously, it does not require the joint 
employer to permit unit employees to park in spaces that no 
longer exist. The record shows that there had been open 
parking in the lot as a whole before the change, and the 
order merely obligates the joint employer to permit all unit 
7/ 
employees to enter the lot and park in open spaces.— 
^County of Cattaraugus. 8 PERB ir3062 (1975). 
2/Even if it were a relevant defense, there could be 
no claim of legal impossibility based upon the proposition 
that all spaces in the lot are already committed to 
employees in other,negotiating units. Several of the spots 
are used by County vehicles. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER 
1. The joint employer to 
a. Restore all parking privileges previously in 
effect at the lot immediately adjacent to the jail, 
and 
b. Upon the demandof SBA. negotiate in good faith 
with it regarding the parking privileges of unit 
employees, and 
c. Sign and post a notice in the form used at all 
locations regularly used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
2. That in all other respects the charges be. and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: May 24. 1985 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
dtAgC^A^L 
David C. Randies^ Memb 
•3sT •J (d* 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the unit represented by the Schenectady 
County Sheriff's Benevolent Association that the County of 
Schenectady and the Schenectady County Sheriff will: 
1. Restore all parking privileges previously in effect 
at the lot immediately adjacent to the jail, and 
2. Upon the demand of SBA, negotiate in good faith 
with it regarding the parking privileges of unit 
employees. 
COUNTY OF SCHENECTADY AND 
SCHENECTADY COUNTY SHERIFF 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2E-5/2V85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAMSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO* C-28 3 5 
WILLIAMSVILLE SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION. NYSUT, AFT. AFL-CIO,. 
Petitioner. 
SAPERSTON. DAY. LUSTIG, GALLICK. KIRSCHNER & GAGLIONE. 
P.C. (THOMAS S. GILL, ESQ., Of Counsel), for Employer 
PAUL LUCZAK, for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Williamsville Substitute Teachers Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) filed the petition herein 
to represent per diem substitute teachers employed by the 
Williamsville Central School District (District). The 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissed the petition and the matter comes to us 
on the Association's exceptions. 
On June 3. 1983. the District sent notices of assurance 
of continuing employment to its per diem substitutes. No 
such notice was sent in 1984 prior to July 2, when the 
District received a demand for recognition, and it did not 
respond to that demand. Three weeks later it sent a notice 
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to all the persons used as per diem substitutes the previous 
year notifying them that they were not being given reasonable 
assurance of continuing employment. They were, however, 
invited to submit applications for inclusion on a new list of 
per diem substitutes which was being compiled. This notice 
said. "We may hire all. some or none of the 1983-84 
substitutes for the 1984-85 school year and you should not 
count on being employed." 
The District then compiled a new list of per diem 
substitute teachers and. in September of 1984. it notified 
the per diems who were on that list. This notice did not 
indicate how much work the per diem substitutes might expect 
or any specific dates when they might work. It merely 
stated. "We are happy to place you on our substitute teacher 
list for the 1984-85 school year." The petition herein was 
filed after the September notification had been sent out. 
Section 201.7(d) of the Taylor Law provides for the 
representation of substitute teachers who receive 
a reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment in accordance with subdivision ten 
of section five hundred ninety of the labor 
law which is sufficient to disqualify the 
substitute teacher from receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits . . . . 
The Taylor Law provision took effect on July 27. 1981. At 
that time the Labor Law provision disqualified teachers from 
5f *.* 
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unemployment insurance benefits in 
any week commencing during the period between 
two successive academic years or terms . . . 
provided . . . there is a reasonable 
assurance that the claimant will perform 
services in such capacity . . . for both such 
academic years or such terms . . . . 
The substitute teachers herein, not having received such 
reasonable assurance, were eligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits during the summer vacation between the 
1983-84 and 1984-85 school years and, under §201.7(d) of the 
Taylor Law, would have been ineligible for representation 
rights. 
An April 2, 1984 amendment added to the Labor Law a 
provision disqualifying teachers from unemployment insurance 
benefits in 
any week commencing during an established and 
customary vacation period or holiday recess, 
not between such academic terms or years. 
provided . . . there is a reasonable 
assurance that the claimant will perform any 
services . . . in the period immediately 
following such vacation period or holiday 
recess, (emphasis supplied) 
The Director and the parties have assumed that the 
notification given to teachers that they are on the District 
per diem substitute list constitutes sufficient assurance 
that they will be offered substitute assignments after 
vacation periods. Thus, according to the Director, if the 
new Labor Law language is read into the Taylor Law, the 
substitute teachers have been given sufficient assurance to 
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disqualify them from unemployment insurance benefits and, 
thereby, to qualify them for representation rights. 
The basis of the Director's decision dismissing the 
petition is the proposition that when one statute 
incorporates a second by reference, as the Taylor Law does 
to the Labor Law, it is presumed to have incorporated only 
those provisions of the earlier statute as existed at the 
time that the new statute was enacted. This proposition is 
challenged by the Association. It argues that the 
legislative history of §201.7(d) of the Taylor Law 
demonstrates a legislative intent that future 
disqualifications from unemployment insurance benefits would 
qualify per diem substitutes for representation rights. 
We need not resolve the question whether the April 2. 
1984 amendment of Labor Law §590.10 has been incorporated 
into §201.7(d) of the Taylor Law. Unlike the Director and 
the parties, we conclude that the Labor Law does not 
disqualify the per diem substitutes of the District from 
unemployment insurance benefits during any vacation period 
or holiday recess, not between academic terms or years. 
In interpreting Labor Law §590.10, we follow the 
interpretations of the New York State Labor Department, the 
agency which administers that law. At page 7 of its 
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March 22. 1985 Special Bulletin A-710-53 the Labor 
Department stated: 
A letter informing an employee that (s)he will 
be placed on a substitute list does not. in 
and of itself, establish reasonable assurance 
of employment ....[D]uring a customary and 
established vacation period or holiday recess 
not between academic terms or years, the law 
requires that there be a reasonable assurance 
that the claimant will perform services "in 
the period immediately following such vacation 
period or holiday recess." As the "period 
immediately following" has been defined as the 
first business day after the vacation or 
recess, a per diem employee has reasonable 
assurance of employment only if (s)he has a 
pre-assigned job to report to on that day, 
(emphasis in original) 
There is no evidence that any per diem substitutes have been 
pre-assigned work on the day after such a vacation or holiday. 
Absent evidence of the elements of reasonable assurance 
of continuing employment, the Labor Department would not 
disqualify per diem substitutes from unemployment insurance 
1 / 2 / _ 
benefits—7 who are otherwise eligible.— it follows that 
the per diem substitutes herein are not eligible for 
representation rights under §201.7(d). Accordingly, for 
reasons other than those given by the Director, we affirm his 
decision. 
i/Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal 
Board. S.S.A. No. 050-50-3744, May 31. 1984. 
J 
^The Labor Law has other criteria for eligibility. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 24. 19 8 5 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
.d C. Randles\.Mei David ndiesN mber 
3fT «.'SW 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA and ONEIDA COUNTY 
SHERIFF. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2773 
ONEIDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 182. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Oneida County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above named employer, in 
the unit described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full-time employees of the Oneida 
County Sheriff's Department. 
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Captain of 
Patrol, Captain of Corrections, 
Sheriff's Secretary. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Oneida County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit found 
appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of. 
) grievances of such employees. 
DATED: May 24. 1985 
Albany, New York 
9729 
